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ATC BEST PRACTICES: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPUTER-BASED SCORING
Todd P. Hubbard

I

Abstract

This paper explains how computer-based scoring of computer-generated scenarios in air traffic was designed and
developed to meet the objectives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Radar Terminal Facility (RTF)
instructors h m the Air Traffic Division at the FAA Academy, other Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) from
Miami and Chicago, and professional educators converged in September 2002 to design, develop, and implement a
course that would enhance controller effectiveness by capturing controller best practices. These best practices were
synthesized from a series of intensiveair traffic control simulationsin a fictionalairspace.Progmamers from the FAA
Academy worked with subject matter experts to design and develop an objective means by which these simulations
could be graded. The result was a modified version of an Academy invented program called SIGNAL. The newly
enhanced software met the team's expectations and looked to have future applications in initial air traffic controIler
training. 'Ihe success of SIGNAL has also had an effect on all pretest-podtest measures for other groups within the
Academy.

ATC Best Practices: Assessing a Skill-Based Program
During 2000, Jane Garvey, the Federal Aviation
.*
A
on(FAA) Admrmstrator,wasfullyfocusedon
the growing number of ~ n w a yincursions. As a means to
solve the problem, Garvey helped the Runway Safety
Program Office draft 10 initiatives, which included an
interestkg provision that requiredall education and training
program to create the means to evaluate each program's
effectiveness pederal Aviation Administration [FAA],
2000). The 10 initiatives were disseminated throughout the
FAA and soon captured the interest of training managers
and statf specialists who were in the best positions to arrest
the runway incursion problem. One group chartered to quell
the growing number of operational deviations was the Air
T M c Team Enhancement (ATTE) Steering Committee.
The group's mix of educators, air trdXc controllers, and air
traftic managers focused their attention on team-building
strategies as a means of allaying these operational
deviations.
By summer's end, members of the ATTE steering
committee had been asked to determine the means by which
the ATTE program could assess its effectiveness. This task
was more a plea for an evaluation instrument than the
invention of yet another process. The committee solicited
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help fiom the FAA Academy's Air Traflic Division at the
Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, since the Academy instructors had experience
with assessing air W c trainkg programs (J. Cope,
personal communication, July 8,2000). The Academy, in
turn, solicited help fbm adult education professionals,
training specialists, and academics from the University of
Oklahoma. In October, Hubbard (2000) issued a report to
the FAA Academy in which the current forms of assessment
of the ATTE program were appraised. In summary, the
report indicated that the program's effectiveness was only
slightly assessed through its use of seW-repo*
surveys.
One could not directly attribute a reduction or gain in
runway incursions to the information gained fiom ATTE
workshops. Without a more definiug instrument with which
to measure the program's efficacy, the merits ofthe program
remained a question. As Hubbard (2000) suggested, the
reason why the ATTE workshops lacked efficacy was
because they were designed to separately sample cognitive,
afktive, or psychomotoractivity. Workshop objectivesdid
not fuse the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains
of learning. Since 2000, the ATTE program has addressed
these issues.
The requirement to measure the efkliveness of
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education and training has been an ongoing initiative within
the FAA and a special interest of the Superintendent of the
FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. In 1999,2001, and 2003
the FAA Academy hosted the International Aviation
Training Symposium (IATS) in Oklahoma City. Hundreds
of civil aviation managers, trainers, and air traffic specialists
h m over 40 countries shared their experiences at each of
the events, validating the FAA Administrator's belief that
program assessment should be the chief interest of all
trainingmanagers. Training evaluation and assessment were
specifically targeted in the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University paper on Quality Mmgement in Aviation
Training (Hisam, 1999), in the Intemational Civil Aviation
Organization's TRAINAIR paper on Regional Training
Planning: A Cooperative Approach to Meeting Shored
Objectives(Fox, 2001), and m EUROCONTROL's paper on
&Learning: the EUROCONTROL fiperience (Drain,
2003).
Still under the influence of international interest m
training assessment and the FAA Administrator's direction
through the Runway Safety Program Office, the
Superintendent of the FAA Academy challenged his staff to
create an assessment model that would measure knowledge
and skill abilities before course start and again after the
course was completed. At nearly the same time, Air Traffic
Service Director (AAT-I), Bill Peacock, announced that he
wanted the FAA Academy Air T-c
Division to create an
Air T d E c Controller (ATC) Best Practices program,
designed to capture best practices fiom highly skilled
controllers and teach these same best practices to all other
controllers.Taken together, the mandatesissuedby the FAA
AQninistrator, the Air T d c Service Director, and the
FAA Academy Superintendent put pressure on the
Academy's Air Traffic Division to explore all opportunities
and means to measure knowledge-based and skill-based
learning.
The purpose of this paper is to expose and
comment on the design, development, and implementation
prouxm that the ATC Best Practices program staff
employed to make this program a success. More
specifically, this paper details the creation of a computerbased scoring system that proved to be the remedy for
pretest-posttest assessment of skill-based learning and
provided an objective means by which the Academy could
isolate and measure best practices in Certified Professional
Controllers (CPC).
Program Design and Development Phase
The technical approach for setting up the Best
Practicesprogram was guided, in part, by the FAA Academy
Guidelinesfor the Development, Delivery, and Evaluation

ofTraining (FAA Academy. March 1998). Modifications to
the guidelines, to accommodate a more flexible
development process, were presented and approved by Aii
Traffic Division management and Mr. Peacock.
Foundational objectiveshad been issued fiom headquarters
in two documents: Performance Measure Results Task 1and
Critical Work Activity 1. Within the documentswere nested
five, broad objectives: (1) develop a tool to measure
effectiveness and impact of technical training, (2) research,
develop, and prototype a process for collecting information,
(3) establish necessary baseline data, (4) establish
improvement goals, and (5) manage to reach goals.
Working in the regulatory milieu, managers at the
FAA Academy discovered that the layers of requests for
precise measures of eflkdiveness h m various levels of
supervision, pointed to the development of a unifying
instrument. In the next few weeks, management would
select a team, devise a strategy for rapid response, and begin
the process of creating a means to measure effectiveness.
Selecting fhe Team

Responsibility for the program was given to Mike
Momson, the supervisor for the Terminal Radar Training
section (AMA-5 12). Morrison, in turn, put together a team
of professionals that included FAA Academy air haEc
controller instructors (Terminal Option), subject matter
experts fiom the Chicago and Miami Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, trainingspecialists
h m Washington's FAA Air TrafficResome Management
Program,and a contract instructional systems designer. The
controllers fiom the tenninal control facilities at Chicago
and Miami were handpickedby the president of the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), John Carr.
Background data were gathered that provided enough
information to complete a task and skills analysis, devise a
training proposal, and set up the framework for a training
development plan. Periodic meetings were scheduled over
the next seven months, to give the team members time to
design the program, develop aprototype scenariofor testing,
testthe scenario, and make modifications for linther testing.
In addition, the FAA Academy provided computer
programmers to support the building of a scoring
management system within the radar simulators, to capture
data during the scenario events.
Dewbpbrg on z~~~tmmalt
The team used a rapid prototyping technique to
create the tools that would measure the effectiveness of
technical traiuhg. Based on direction firom the program's
founder and principal supporter, Mr. Peacock,the program
had to measure the three ingredients of air traffic events:
safety, expeditious control of aircraft, and efficient use of
JAAER, Spring 2006
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airspace. Based on the time constraints imposed by FAA
higher headquarters, the logical venue for the new program
was the Radar Training Facility laboratory at the FAA
Academy. The most logical and most accessible medium for
the project was the Academy's radar simulator.
FAA Academy Radar Training Facility (RTF)
,
imlmctors, along with the subject matter experts (SMEs)
fiom Chicago and Miami, discussed how they would assess
a controller's ability, while also capturing best practices.
Human-based assessment presented too many reliability
challenges. Tbe only viable non-human alternative of any
note was an idea to program the simulatorcomputer to score
specific items. This solution, although created by humans,
would not involve humans as observers or evaluators.
Having selected the means by which controllers
would be scored, the team set out to establish baseline data
for controller capacity. As the team discovered, controller
capacity had to be defined systematically. Controller
capacity was simply defined as the sum of the aircraft
landed, minus tie result of operational errors, procedural
errors, and inaccurate phraseology. Operational errors are
defined as "an occurrence attriiutable to an element of the
air traflic system in which less than the applicable
separation minima results between two or more aircraf€,or
between an aircraft and terrain or obstacles" (Department of
Transportation [DOT], 2002, p. 5-1). Five types of
procedural error were tracked, they were transfer of
communication errors (instructed to contact Tower before
Final Approach Fix), intercept altitude errors (intercept the
localizer above the glide slope), intercept angle errors
(excessive angle), interceptpoint errors (aircraft intercepted
the final approach inside the approach gate), and approach
clearance altitude errors(aircraft not on a published route or
segment of the approach being cleared for approach).
Based on the advice of the SMEs h m Miami and
Chicago, the computer progmmmhg s W and RTF
instructors created an aggressive simulation of ATC Level
12traffic volume. The scenario was tested repeatedly by the
RTF instructors, before being given to the ATC Level 12
members of the team. Following numerous trials, the ATC
Level 12 SMEs agreed that the scenario was equivalent to
the traffic level they had intended. However, two items on
the planning list still needed to be de&rmhed: (I) determine
the duration of each scenario, and (2) determine the 100041
capacity level of an ATC Level 12 controller. A& M e r
trials the team agreed on a 30-minute session length.
A 30-minute session time was chosen for three
reasons: (1) 30 minutes provided enough time to measure
safety, expediency, and efficiency at the 100% intensity
level; (2) 30-minute sessions allowed the instructors to run

more scenarios throughout a given training day; and (3)
controllers working beyond peak performance begin to
fBtigue at about 30 minutes, normally followed by increased
operational errors and deviations, which would not be
tolerated in a real situation.
The team had defined controller capacity, but they
had not manipulated controller capacity by subjecting
controllers to air traffic intensity levels greater than and
lesser than their peak capacity (100Y0capacity level). A first
step toward documenting changes in controller capacity was
to establish the perfect solution; and the simulator's
computer provided the means. However, a perfect solution
had to be based on the parameters given to human
participants and those parameters had not been fully
expressed. This led to another period of extensive trials,
which in the end resulted in the validation of a series of air
traffic intensity levels.
Establishing air traffic intensity levels for ATC
Level 12 controllers proved to be difficult, because it was
virtually impossible to account for all the variance. As the
team began their trials, they set limits to the environment to
help control variance. For example, all traffic would
sequence through two points on the radar map, called posts,
instead of four points on the map. This limited the scan
pattern for new aircraft to just two areas. Further,
intermediatealtitude restrictionscaused by airway corridors
were eliminated. 'Ibis eliminated confusion when giving
vectors and giving insttuctions for descent into the radar
pattern. All of the aircraft were sequenced to a single
runway, as opposed to a multiple-runway operation. To help
were
each controller focus on arriving traflic, allsdeliminated. To ensure that all controllers would have an
equal chance of succeeding, the team created a lesson that
explained the airspace and created extra scenarios to help
controllerspractice the new procedures before being graded.
Even the radio calls h m the aircraft were
controlled. Pseudo pilots are commonly used to give the air
traffic controller students practice communicating with
pilots. These pseudo pilots receive trainingbefore assisting
in the radar lab, but they can have off-peak-performance
days. This problem with consistency was alleviated by preselecting pilots and then using the same pilots for all trials.
Having reduced the variance in the radar
environment of the lab, the team refined their definition of
the 1000/0solution. A scenario was considered to be a 1W h
solution if the intensity level of air traffic equaled the
controller's capcity to safely control those airct;lft for 30
minutes. This meant that duringthe 30-minute scenario, the
controller could not commit any errors. Further, the
controller had to sequence the maximum number aircraft to
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the outer marker and had to efficientlyuse the airspace. The
first 100% solution was set by the SMEs from Miami and
Chicago. Confidence for their 10WA solution was based on
W intensity level.
trials at the 1 1
Determining any degree of difficulty above the
100% level was made possible by first establishing
normative behavior among ATC Level 12 controllers. Over
a period of weeks, the Miami and Chicago consulting
controllershad established a consistent pattern of controller

behavior at their peak output level; which prompted the
team to make a judgment about this level of consistency.
However, the team was reluctant to generalize the behavior
to all ATC Level 12 controllers; nonetheless, they predicted
similar outcomes in future trials.
As a precaution, the team created a control for their
expexhents. The results of the computer-generated
controlled trial are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Computer-generated Score (prototypical phase)
A i d
Operatid Errors
Procedurai
High
I
M
o
d
.
I
Low
Landed
Enms
0
21
O b l O
The computer-based controlledtrial excited interest
in a computer-based scoring and data-gathering instrument.
During the next two months the programmers modified the
~cademy'ssimulatorsupport softwareprogram (SIGNAL),
allowing the team to observe a perfect simulator session
without the influence of a pseudo pilot or an air traffic
controller. After several trials, the programming was
perfkcted to the point that the team was w i l l i i to use
SIGNAL as the new computer-based scoring device.
Objective data, based on ratio scale accuracy, would
eliminate human error and would increase the inbmd and
external reliability of the program.
The three parameters that were measured by the
computer were safety, expediency, and efficiency. The
safety component of the computer score measured
operational errors. Operational errors were measured by
calculations of IFR separation loss, using a high, moderate,
and low scale that had been derived from the FAA Order
7210.56C (dated August 15, 2002), Air T r m c Quality
Assurunce. The calculation tables fomd in Chapter 6
(Severi' Index) of that order were used to assess points for
loss of standard separation and loss of separation based on
wake turbulence criteria The sum of the points was used to
calculate the severity of the error.
The computer also kept track of how many aircraft
crossed the outer marker inbound for a final landing, which
the team viewed as a measure of expediency. The latitudelongitude of the outer marker in relation to the position of
each aimaft on final approach was used to determine when
the aircraft was counted as having landed. If the aircraft
crossed the outer marker, the computer would tally another
landing, sincethe scenariodid not involve
coordination between the Tower controller and the Final

Standard Excess
Mileage
8.77

Total Score

321

controller.
Efficient airspace control was determined by taking
the average separation between aircraft on final
approach--starting when an aircraft turned on to final and
ending when the air& crossed the outer marker. All
average and excess mileage distances were based on nose to
tail separation between aircraft on W.
All separation
distances that exceeded the minimum required, were
summed as total excess mileage. Low mileages at the end of
a 30-minute session indicated more efficient control of the
airspace.
On a computermonitor, positioned at an observing
station used by instructors at the back of the simulation
room, instructors could view, in real time, how each
participant was doing in relation to safety, expediency, and
efficiency. Each package consisted of a number of sheets of
data, starting with a cover sheet that depicted total aircraft
landed and the safety score, separated by type of error.
Phraseology errors were also depicted on the cover sheet,
and were the only subjective component of the score. The
next few pages showed the raw data breakout of all the
separation errors. This allowed each instructor to fisther
analyze the reason for each error. An event listing that
recorded event time, event name, aircraft identification,
aircraft type, and spatial data immediately followed the
error-scoring sheets. Average and total excess mileage
sbtktics were shown on the last page of the package.
The control mechanismhaving been set and having
implemented a computer-based scoring system, the team
was in a position to test their prediction about ATC Level 12
controller behavior. To testtheiipredictionthe teamdevised
a plan to validate the existing 1W/o
capacity level and to
reinforce that validation with comparable testing of
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fashion to Yerkes and Dodson, it was reasoned that as the
intensity level of traffic was increased, the number of errors
would also increase. Further, the team expected to see a
breakdown in efficiency. Since safety, efficiency, and
expediency translated to numerical scores, it was easy to
measure incremental differences in capacity. Therefore, it
was quite possible to set a declination scale of behavior that
exceeded the 100%limit. Having completed the second step
toward standardization of behavior, the team began a new
course of testing.
Given the low number of participants in the initial
test of the 1 W h solution, the team expanded the
standardization process to groups of instructors containing
ATC Level 12 controllers, as well as controllers fi-om air
W 5 c facilities with less intense W 5 c volume. The
computertrial scores and the Miami-Chicago
scores presented the team with a starting point for further
testing. Table 2 shows the mean scores for all the categories
at the 1W?'intensity level, using 24 participants. Range of
scores was 100-28 1, compared to the range of 200-28 1 for
the Miami-Chicago trials.

controllers fi-om ATC Levels 8-12 facilities. The first step
toward standardization of behavior required the team to find
an average score for each of the three categories. Very
quickly, within the first 30 days of having a computer
scoring system, the Miami and Chicago controllers set
benchmark scores for the three parameters.
The secondstep toward standardhtion of behavior
required the team to verify the average scores. They elected
to incrementally increase the intensity level of the scenario
problem, in hopes that they could measure the decline of
controller capacity. This procedure was based on
conclusions derived by Yerkes and Dodson id their study of
arousal and task complexity. Their upside down U-shaped
curve indicated that the quality of performance declined as
the arousal state exceeded peak perfonnance (Telfer &
Biggs, 1988). The shape of the curve indicated that the
decline was steady. Having been satisfied earlier by the
incredible consistency of control of this initial group of
participants, the team q m & d y pushed these same
controllers
their peak, to measure the difference
between 1 W h capacity and some predicted lesser capacity
at traffic volumes higher than the standard. In similar

Table 2. Prototypical Phase Data, 1W ?intensity level (n=24)
Average
Average
Average
Procedural
Operational
Emrs
Aircraft
Emrs
Landed
(safety)
(expeditions)

2.1

I

Score

Mod.

High
18.7
19.5

Low
Errors
1
1.1
Miami-Chicago Trials

Average
Total

Average
Standard
Excess
Mileage
(emciency)

I

I

Given the data b m the additional trials, it was
surmised that the range of combined scores and the averages
for efficient and expeditious control were more telling
components of standard perfonnance. By comparing the
Miami-Chicago results with these additional trials, the team
developed a sense of what might happen in the first course
conduct. That hypothesis suggested that at the 1W ?level,
one could anticipate averages at 19 aircraft (expeditious),
14.2 miles (efficiency), and 208 points (combined score).
Testing was also performed at reduced intensity
levels, such as 75%, 880%, and 90% (see Table 3). These
alternative scenarios were the product of the completed
Miami-Chicago tests and were validated by repeated trials

I

14.57

I

13.8

184

1

232

by RTF instructors at the Academy(75%: n=37; 80%: n=34;
90%: n=28). Members of the team commonly accepted that
certified controllerswho were not familiarwith the airspace
suppo&g these scenarios would not perform well until
becoming more familiar with the environment. Therefore,
during the remaining trials and in the first course conduct,
participants would spend at least 12 hours building speed
and familiarization before nmning the final scenario at the
100% level. The intewening levels of intensity, with
established practice time at each level, provided the team
with a means to measure improvemenr thus meeting the
fourth objective of the Administrator's list.

--
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Table 3. Prototypical Phase Data, Varied Intensity Levels (averaged data)
Intensity
Operational Errors
Aimaft
hoc. Standard
Level
Landed
Excess
(safety)
Mileage
(expeditious)
(efficiency)
High

75%
80%
90%

16.05
17.70
17.89

Low
-27
.35
.28

Mod.
1
1.05
1.42

Periodicallythroughoutthe baseline data collection
process the team refined the scenarios and programmed
adjustments into the computational grading performed by
the computer. The refinements and adjustments influenced
the internal validity of the baseline scores to the extent that
a separate trial was conducted in February, just before the
first ATC Level 12 first course conduct (also referred to as
operationaltryout). Data were collected during this separate
trial. These new data were compared to the initial baseline
data and both sets of values were used as referents for the

Errors
1.05
1.67
1.57

12.58
14.12
13.48

I

1 ~dai

(
Stand Excess

Low
Errors
19
0
0
0
2
19
1
17
0
Note: One of the participants did not complete the pretest.

High

178
199
191

firstATC Level 12 operational tryout data
Pretest-Posttest Assessment
Four individuals were chosen to participant in the
pretest-posttest trial. Each participant completed the 100%
pretest scenario, practiced at the 75%, 80% and 90% levels
for two days, and then completed the 1W/oposttest
scenario. The same intermediate intensity level scenarios
were used for each participant. The data were recorded and
adyzed (Tables 4 & 5).

Table 4.Pretest Assessment, Preliminary Tryout
~ircraff (
~perational~rmrs
ROC.

I

Total
Score

Moderate
1
6
6

15.9
1737
16.7

Table 5.Posttest Assessment, Preliminary Tryout
Opemtional Errors

Score

220
110
63

I Total

Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the data were part of a preliminary tryout.
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The following comparison of total scores indicates pretest-posttest alignment by individual.
Participant 1
2201281
Participant 2
631130
Participant 3
110/190
Participant 4
*I263
* indicates the absence of a pretest
The intervening period between the pretest and
posttest was set at two days. Rather than being set by some
scientific means, the intervening time of two days was
chosen for purely administrative reasons, to help cut the cost
of the program. If the course were contained within three
days, each participant could travel on Mond&yand Friday,
avoidinghaving to pay per diem for travel over a weekend.
During the three days of the course the instructors planned
to run an initial assessment (pretest) of controller skill at the
1W/o level, introducebest practices to CPCs, allow time to
integrate the new skills, and then measure the improvement
on a final skill test (posttest).
From the data collectedduringthe operational frials
and operational tryout, it appeared that the team had met the
Administrator's first objective: develop a tool to measure
eflectiveness and impact of technical training.
Lesson Development Phase
Maagingfor Change
During the time that the air traffic controllers on
the team were establishing the baseline data for the program,
other members on the team were creating the means to pass
on best practices to the participantswho would complete the
program after the operational tryouts. The program was
planned for a one-hour introduction (administrativedetails),
followed by a 1W/o intensity level scenario (performed by
each participant), followed by a three-hour block where best
practices were discussed. During the three-hour block, the
instructor used an active 100% scenario to illustrate when
best practices should be employed. After the instructional
period, the participants were given a number of practice
sessions at the 75%, 80% and 90% intensity levels. AAer
each 30-minute session, each participant was debriefed for
30 minutes. Following the debriefing of the scenario, each
participant completed another practice session at the same
or higher intensity level. This process continued for four
hours on day one and eight hours on day two. On the third
day the participants practiced at the 1 W h intensity level
were given a 30-minuterest, and then were given the final,
100% intensity level scenario. Following the posttest, the
scores were tallied and the best performer was announced.
At the end of the program, each participant was given some
time to critique the design and offer suggestions for
improvement, to include suggesting additional best
practices.
The initial set of best practices had been derived
fiom observations of the expert controllers hm Chicago
and Miami terminal approach facilities. Since these experts
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were selected fiom all terminal option controllers, the team
was reasonably sure that these individuals would be capable
of isolating those techniques that made them better
controllers, in terms of expeditious, safe, and efficient
control of aircraft. Most of the initial best practices were
variations of the controller's standard tools for separation:
vectors, sequencing, and speed control. A list of these
practices formed the basis for the scenario debriefing sheet
(see Appendix, Scenario Debriefing Sheet, for a cqmplete
list of best practices).
As the team discussed how the program would
evolve, they came up with a solution for long-term growth
that would ensure continued success. The team envisioned
using the top performers as adjunct instructors for future
iterations of the best practices program. In this way, the
program would be staffed by a collection of the best
controllers, who would in turn pass on their achievements to
the rest of the controller force. The team felt that this
approach would fulfill the wishes of AAT-1 and might
influence the controller population in such a way that air
traffic control would be safer, more efficient, or more
expeditious and it would meet the Administrator's fifth
evaluation objective: manage to reach goals.
The team became concerned about the singular
focus on ATC Level 12 facilities and the omission of input
h m levels of traffic below the ATC 12 level. To manage
the differences between ATC Levels, the best practices
design and development team planned to establish new
baselines for each level. The process for establishing the
baseline would be largely the same as was used in the
prototype program. However, each baseline would be
supported by scenarios that sampled the kind of traffic
volume and the appropriate complexity level indicative of
any specific ATC Level. As in the ATC Level 12course, the
top performers for each ATC Level course would be asked
to join the adjunct staff for future classes of controllers.
Overcoming Acceptable Risks
There were a number of issues that the team
worked through, but did not fully resolve during the design
and development process. One threat to internal validity was
set of behaviors that would define
the lack of a quan-le
the average certified professional controller. The team had
reviewed the knowledge and performance requirements for
a terminal option, certified controller (Ammeman,
Fairhurst, Hostetler, & Jones, 1989; Broach & Manning,
1997), but the literature review did not present the means to
capture performance. The team subsequently chose to
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compromised. However, what the team found during the
baseline trials and the operational tryouts was that the
inte~eningsessions seemed to diminish the memory of the
pretest.
The problem of learning regression did occur in
nearly all the participants. Certified controllers fiom several
terminal option facilities demonshated a pronounced
decrease in controller effectiveness after taking the pretest.
The 100Y0intensity pretest shocked the participants to the
degree that when given scenarios at 75% and 80% of peak
intensity, the controllers did poorly. Compare the data in
Table 7 with the data in Table 6. Notice that the
effectivenessscores (air& landed) between the pretest and
the intermediateintensity level scenarioshas decreased. The
safety (error rate) scores also showed an overall decrease
Srom the pretest.

sample knowledge, attitude, and performance
simultaneously during the scenario by using the computerbased scoring system. The data set the boundaries for high
and low performance.
Another known risk to the project was the pretestposttest assessment strategy. It is commonly reported that a
pretest can have an affect on the posttest, depending on the
time interval between the tests (Wiersma, 2000). The time
interval between tests was at least 12 hours, which in itself
would suggest that the pretest would influence the posttest;
but that was not the case in the best practices program.
During the 12-hour interval each participant performed at
least five other scenarios. The scenarios were based on the
same airspace, but the amount of traffic and the rate of
tratiic were different for each scenario. Had the scenarios
been similar, one would hazard a guess that the posttest was

Table 6. ATC Level 12 First Course Conduct Pretest-Posttest Comparison
Total
Stand
Proc.
qmtional E m
Aircraft
Excess
Score
Mileage
Errors
High I Moderate I Low

I
1

Pretest
19
16
19
20

1
4
2
2

19
19
18
19

0
0
0
0

0
2
3
2
Posttest
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

12.15
12.2
12.89
9.94

250
86
140
200

Person 1
Person 2
Person3
Person4

0
1
2
2

15.08
12.6
14.72
8.98

300
260
206
240

Person1
Person2
Person 3
Person4

Table 7. ATC Level 12 First Course Conduct (Intermediate intensity levels)
ATC12Op
Efficiency
EfExtiveness
Kety
I
Tryout
I
(excess
( (airclaftlanded) I (numberof

I

I
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Discussion
In a regulated air traffic environment, new
processes and procedures are oftenchallengedby thosewho
believe that nothing has changed or by those who lack
imagination. During the Best Practices project, new
instructional development processes were challenged, but
the team countered with an imagined process that provided
for simultaneous design and development. All of the team
members were allowed to engage fkeely. Management kept
the group centered by reminding everyone of the objectives,
but management did not dictate how each person would
perceive the project, nor did they limit each person's
involvement. The members of the team that perceived
intuitively felt the flow of the project and allowed the
project to tulk back. Those team members that perceived
more concretely followed the established procedures set by
regulation or precedent.
What had not been intentionally thought out before
the project began was how people would relate to each
other. However, h m a crew resource management point of
view, persons @valved in the development of this project
behaved in ways that exemplified the very best in effective
communication, decision-making, risk management,
workload management, and situational awareness. If any
other group would attempt this project, they should select
persons who already function well on teams. Perhaps a brief
description of the team members would help illustrate this
point.
m e People
Objectives laid down by Mr. Peacock provided a
central focus for the team. Having thus established the
broader boundaries of the project, each team member
concentrated on exploiting his or her own gifts. It is more
fitting to describe personal contriiutions as gifts than to call
themskills,atleastinthiscase;because~11~onthe~
did not solely fimction h m their acknowledged skill set,
but rather included unheralded skills that became visible as
they were needed.
The manager of the project could be descn'bed as
a gifted negotiator and coach. He used his gifts to help each
team member see where he or she could contribute to the
end goal. He also knew how to preserve the best fkom each
member and showed each member how he or she could knit
his or her effort into the fabric of the finalproduct.The RTF
bstructors selected for this project demonstrated great selfcontrol. Instead of fighting for control, each instructor
channeled his or her energy into perfecting the scenario
designs. This was padcularly evident when the ATC Level
12 controllers from Miami and Chicago visited the
Academy. Any personal bravado, heard during the trial
period, was mitigated by over-powering professionalism.
In a project that @ereti the art of the air t d E c
controller, one might think that anyone without those
credentials would be overlooked or overwhelmed by those

having the skill. However, this was not the case. Credit for
the b i o n of skills should be given to the manager of the
team. He extended the effectiveness of the team by letting
parts of the team work independently, convening the whole
group to discuss new features in the design and development
of the project.
Rapid Prototyping
Rapid prototyping proved to be a very useful
process during the development of this project. It allowed
sub-groups to work independently on specific elements of
the design. It also invited experts to engage and disengage
for finite periods of time, thus h i n g them to teach in the
classroom or to work on other projects after their job within
the project was completed. Most importantly, it allowed the
team to shift directions when parts of the design did not
work well.
Objective Scoring
Perhaps the most beneficial outcome ofthe project
was the creation of an objective scoring system for the air
t d E c control simulator. SIGNAL software provided the
instructors a common point of reference for assessing safety,
efficiency, and expediency. At the writing of this paper, the
Academy is validating an enhauced version of SIGNAL to
assess students in the initial air traffic control course.
Historical scoringroutines for airtraffic control lab
sessions had relied on the experience and judgment of the
instructor in assessing student behavior. To put it simply,
hard graders graded hard and easy graders graded easy. The
dichotomy in grading practices among instructors left the
students at a disadvantage. Remedies for the perceived or
real diffkm~cein gradingstandardshad been attempted over
the years, but those efforts had not always been successll.
With the advent of Air Traffic Controller Best F'ractices,
management fmally found an objective means by which
students or CPCs could be graded.
R e t e s t - P ~ A s s ~
The computerized grading scheme that the
programmers had created for Best Practices had a
prospective effect on the initial air traflic controller training,
while also providing a real time solution for the assessment
of changes in learning during project development. Pretestposttest schemes have, for decades, been successfblly
applied to assess a change in knowledge during air t d E c
control training. The interval scale data gained h m the
paper and pencil tests provided a precise measure of
learning of all the course objectives.
Paper and pencil testing has worked well for
knowledge-based learning, but has not proven e£fective in
assessing a change in skilled performance, particularly skills
that require the person to operate on and respond to a
machine. Perhaps the reason why skill-based learning has
resisted the pretest-posttest assessment routine, is because
no one expects a person to have any pre-course skill. Why
measure pre-course performance if the reason for the course
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is to teach the skill? Paper and pencil testing is also the
wrong medium for the assessment of controller skill.
Computer scoring, such as that accomplished by
SIGNAL during Best Practices, is the remedy for skillbased assessment, or at least is a great start. Whereas
pretest-posttest measures of skill were inadequate before
Best Practices, they have since become adequate and
relevant. Perhaps that success is partly due to the ratio scale
data now available with SIGNAL, which by comparison
diminishes the value of interval scale data obtained through
the paper and pencil means. That success is also due in part
to the context in which SIGNAL was used. The persons
being scored in the validated Best Practices course were
going to be fully qualified controllers who worked at ATC
Level 12 facilities. They would be personswith a great deal
of selfesteem and a great deal of proven talent in their skU.
Had the scoringbeen any less objective--say with Academy
RTF instructors-the participantswould have cried foul and
the whole program would have dissolved under the weight
of bad press. One must keep in mind that these participants
were also bargaining unit members. Therefore, it was
imperative that the scoring be objective. However, this type
of scoring has limited potential if used elsewhere for air
t d i c controller training. This is precisely why the
Academy is undergoing a validation of an enhanced version
of the original idea.
Before leaving this subject, it is useful to note that
computer scoring does not diminish the need for subjective
intervention by expert air traffic controllers. This issue was
raised during the Bart Practices trials. If a controller
intentionallyreducesthe separationbetween aircrafton final
to some distauce below that requid by FAA Order
7110.65, he or she is in violation of the Order and can be
sanctioned for the safety error-in a real world situation.
However, this apparmtly unsafe act is not always unsafe,
even though it is m violation of the Order. It is a matter of
control. Just as there are those who believe that a little
compression (2.7 miles instead of 3 miles) cannot hurt if the
situation on final aprwoach was controlled, there are others
who see no gray in the Order. 'Ihis point has been so highly
contended over the years that the FAA has published
memoranda that allow some facilities to run aircraft closer
than the established minimums.
The computer scoring system can measure
distances between aircraft, but that system lacks the power
to understand why or how. Expert controllers can determine
why and how. Any grading system in the fbture will need
to incorporate the human element.
Effecls of Learning Regression
Computer scoring of each scenario allowed the
teamtotrackshiftsinleamin&Forexample,theteammted
that most of the l l l y qualified controllers would perform
worse on their first, 100% intensity level scenario. Using
321 points as the perfect computer score, the team saw

scores in the 100s on the first, 100% scenario. It was
common for these same individuals to remain in the 100s
even when given scenarios at the 75% and 85% levels.
However, after six or so additional scenarios these same
participants began to show some improvement. By the end
of the trial period, these controllers routinely scored in the
mid to high 200s.
Based on the evidence of dozens of trials with
Academy instructors, the Best Practices developersbelieved
that any one person's attitude toward the Best Practices
scenarios would be positive and welcoming. As a whole, the
projected view was that all or most of the fimveparticipants
would have a similar reaction to the training as did the
Academy instructors. A representative fiom Chicago
terminal radar control forecasted that ATC Level 12
controllers would have little trouble adapting to the
scenarios and would do very well, perhaps even becoming
bored at times. By the end of the first course conduct,
thoughts that the project would improve controller skills,
while giving a boost to the ego of each participant, were
h t r a t e d by an unforeseen reaction to perceived failure.
No one on the Best Practices team was prepared
for tbe d o n s of the fully d e d ATC Level 12
controllers. The scores on the first 1W/o
scenario (pretest)
were 250, 86, 140, and 200. Scores in the 200s were not
exceptional, but they were well within the range anticipated
by the team. Scores below 200 were not new; but the team
had anticipated a better showing, even for the pretest
scenario. The reader will recall that the range of scores for
the Miami-Chicago trials was 200-28 1, while the range for
otherparticipantsduringthetrialperiodwas100-281.
Perhaps the most shocked were the team
representatives fiom Miami and Chicago. They were
profoundly surprised by the participants' failure to readily
adapt to new airspace. SMEs h m Chicago and Miami had
insistedthat ATC Level 12controllerscould control a i d
anywhere, any time. The team now knows that this
announcement might have been made to identify ATC Level
12 controllersas superiorto o k controllers. However, this
notion was not supported by the first group of participants.
The participants were equally surprised by the results of
their efforts. Perhaps they too had the same impression as
the Miami and Chicago controllers.
Surprise led to selfdoubt for some. On repeated
trials, the poorer performers stumbled on the less intense
scenarios. By the end of day two of the course, one
participant was starting to show improvement, another was
maintaining an average to good score on all trials, a third
participant was trapped in continual poor performance, and
the fourth participant was getting consistently better on each
trial. Since controllers are largely egoQiven, the effect of
having an ace performer and a poor performer was estemnbuildingto the good p e r f o m while devastatingto the poor
performer. Going into the third and final day of the course,
'
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efficiency scores improved when the controller reduced the
excess mileage between aircraft on final approach for
landing.
In most of the cases, the participants did not show
marked improvement in all three categories. Table 8 shows
what improved and what did not improve. The expediency
scores, when comparing pretest and posttest results by
individual, showed one gain, two losses, and one even set of
scores. The safety scores showed a marked change; whereas
all participants made moderate or low operational errors in
the pretest, none of the participants made operational errors
on the posttest. Efficiency of air trafiic control h m pretest
to posttest for these individuals was counter-intuitive. One
might think that there is a link between number of aircraft
landed, excessive mileage, and total score, if operational
errors were the same for all participants. For example, if a
person were to land 20 aircraft during a 30-minute session,
it might seem logical that high effectiveness scores would be
associated with low excess mileage scores. This is not a
proper analysis of these scores. On three posttest scores
individuals landed 19 aircraft. None of the three had any
operational errors. However, the excess mileage among the
three was very different (19115.08, 19112.6,1918.98). If we
compare these data with &a1 scores, we see how
troublesome it would be to predict a final result if the
prediction were based on aircraft landed and excess mileage
(19115.081300, 19112.6/260, 1918.981240). Based on the
data, it seems that procedural errors made the diEmmce
between a great score and an average score.

the participantsstarted to vocalize their feelings. One person
said that he was embarrassed by his performance and could
not believe he was doing so poorly. Another person was so
embarrassed that he apologized to the instructors of the
course and his fellow participants, even during the final
critique.
F l n a l R ~
The pre and post scores, when grouped together,
indicated that the course was a success (2501300, 861260,
1401206, 2001240). The person with the large
excursion-hm 86 on the first 1W/o
scenarioto 260 on the
final 1000hscenario-showed the most improvement, which
would not have been predicted by the poor showing during
the interveningtrials. His scores remained low up to the last
few trials. It was clear that this person had some
psychomotor breaktbrough moment, where everything
became clear. The individual starting with 200 and ending
with 240 had performed consistently throughout the three
days. Surprisingly, this individual had the lowest excess
mileage score (8.98 miles). He landed as many aircraft as
the person scoripg 300, but he lost points with procedural
errors. The highest scoring individual secured his top score
by not making any errors, but bad the most excess mileage
of the group (15.08 miles).
ATC Best Practices was designed to enhance air
traffic controller skills. The program measured three
categories: safety, efficiency, and expediency. Safety scores
improved when the controller reduced the number of errors
per session. Expediency scores improved when the
controller landed more aircraft during a session. And finally,
Table 8. ATC Level 12 Outcomes
Operational Errors
Aircraft

I

[ High

1

19
16
19

Moderate
1
4
2

1 Low I
Pretest
0
2
3

Proc.

-1

Excess

Errors
0
0
0

12.15
12.2
12.89

250
86
140

Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
Person 4
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
Person 4
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Air traffic controllers are highly competitive and
take every opportuuityto establishthemselvesas the best, in
everything. From sizes of houses, to prices of cars, to
longest period without an operational error or deviation, to
handling the most traffic at an ATC Level 12 facility,
controllerswant to be the best. Despii each person's desire
to be the best, the FAA has not had an objective means by
which it could measure the best. ATC Best Practices was
developed to do two things: (1) capture best practices fiom
among air t d E c controllers, and (2) enhance controller
skills by helping each person use these best practices to
improve their ability. Finding a means to measure the best
occupied the time of more than a dozen individuals over the
course of a year. When they finished, they had a decisive
tool to measure air traflic control and they had a means by
which they could capture best practices fiom among the
FAA's best controllers.
Notwithstanding the need to meet Mr. Peaaxk's
objectives for the program, it was also important to build a
program that satisfied the five objectives of the
Administrator's policy on training. Without any formula or
other project to copy, the A K Best Practices team created
their own prototype, tested the prototype, validated the
prototype, and used it to conduct their first course. They not
only created the means to measure controller performance,
they developed a strategy to capture best practices and use
those best practices to enhance the rest of the controller
force.
Despite the huge successes, there were casualties.
The team had overlookedthe effects of competition on fully
certified, well experienced, controllers. To be fair, the team
had not overlooked the effect of competition--that
controllers thrived on it, but it had not included in that
analysis any discussion of what would happen if a controller
did poorly and reacted emotionally to that poor
performance. While meeting all of the other goals and
objectives, the team had ruled out any notion that controllers
would expose a thin skin.
On the lidday of the first course, one of the ATC
Level12 controllersapologizedfor his poor performance. He
publicly announced hi feelings to his fellow participants,
the instructorsof the course, and the controller-~hers.
His apology was emotional, suggesting that he had been
emotionally wounded. Several days after the participants
had returned to their facilities, this same person e-mailed the
instructors and apologized again. What had not been a
t course conduct had
prominent factor dwing the h
suddenly become a factor as the team analyzed course
outcomes.
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There are a number of recommendations for those
wishing to assess best practices among air traffic controllers.
First,it is important that each ATC facility level have its
own bestpracticesprogram. What works for ATC Level 12
might not work for ATC Levels below 12. Secondly, since
there are differences between controllers fiom different
ATC Level 12 f a c i e s , more trials should be nm on
persons h m more diverse ATC Level 12 facilities. With
only three field controllers, one h m Miami and two from
Chicago, it was easy to tailor the course toward the
influences of those two areas of control. Had the team
expanded their focus beyond these two areas, they might
have prepared a more representative scenario for a broader
assortment of ATC Level 12 participants. Thirdly, it might
have been a good idea to make more time for discussions
about best practices. Time had been allotted for a brief
discussion of best practices on the first day and some more
time had been allotted for a brief discussion on the last day.
However, this might not be enough time to capture tips to
enhance controller eWveness.
Lastly, any futureeffort in this area should address
the effect of failure in a simulated environment. Persons are
affected by Eailure m difkmt ways. Some persons do not
see any difference between simulation and reality. Others
value the simulator and the real world equally. The FAA
will need to evaluate its stand on this issue. Is the Academy
that right place to call into question a person's a b i i ,
especially when that person's abiity has been dully
certified? There are mechanisms for this type of evaluation
at the facility. The FAA Academy is not wing to decertify
a controller, based on his or her performance in this course.
Instead, the Academy wishes to enhance a controller's
ability. If a controller's ability is not enhanced by this
course, the course manager should be finding out why.
As is often irue, too few studies have been done in
this area Computer scoring of radar control problems is
relatively new at the FAA Academy and much more data
needs to be collected before the instrument is perfected.
Samplesizeduringthefirstcourse~ductwastoodto
derive accurateresults,despite the rigorous proceduresused
to establish a standard. More candidates will be needed
before the results provide meaningful input.
Every effort is being made to further the research
m computer-generated scoring at the Academy. It is clear
that skill-based assessment can be adequately measured by
objective grading practices such as SIGNAL, but there will
alwaysbe a place for the subjectiveopinions of experienced
controllers.
At the writing of this report on Best Practices the
FAA staffers in Washington are planning to revive the
JAAER, Spring 2006
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program and complete studies to include facilities with
traffic counts below the ATC Level 12 level (M. Morrison,

personal communication, June 14,2005).
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Appendix

ATC Best Practices

.

Scenario (circle one):

Scenario Debriefing Sheet
75%

80%

90%

1000/0

Vectoring
Shotgun to base 6om NE gate Time
Flow to airport fix for downwind fiom NE gate
Flow to airport fix for downwind fiom NW gate
Fly over fix to left downwind (Runway 28)
Consistent downwind ground track
Double downwind
Vector from NE flow to NW flow
Dual downwind

I

Heading

ueoeing
NE flow to downwind with observable spacing pattern
NW flow to downwind with observable spacing pattern
~r6nt-loadingat beginning of push
Builds gaps for wake turbulence
Builds gaps for -65 spacing requirements
Consistent turns to base and final Base turn mileage
Straight-in sequence control Heading off localizer
Scan pattern (area, sweep, hub and spoke)
Tie points

8
0

See speed control.

Control
Routinely slows aimaft at NE gate Time
2lOkts Time
Routinely slows aircraft at NW gate 250kts
Routinely slows aircraft on downwind 250kts 2lOkts 1Wkts 170kts
Other
Routinely slows aircraft on final 210kts 190kts 170kts Other
Slows individual aircraft as the need arises A/C ID
Position
Time
Straight-in speed control Reduce to
kts Increase to
kts

Priority of Duties
Established a recognizable pattern of control between gates, downwind,
base turn, and final
Took early control of aircraft at NW gate to manage flow
Took early control of aircraft at NE gate to manage flow
Concentrated on base tums at a designated mileage Mileage
Concentrated on consistent downwind ground track
Concentrated on speed control at the gate or certain points

0

Errors

Aircraft Landed
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